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Abstract. The existence of large federal budget deficits in the U.S., especially in recent years, raises 
the specter of concern regarding their potential effects on real interest rates (as well as economic 
growth and capital formation). This study provides current and new empirical evidence on the impact 
of the federal budget deficit on the real interest rate yields on intermediate-term debt issues of the U.S. 
Treasury, represented herein by the ex post real interest rate yields on three-year Treasury notes and 
seven-year Treasury notes, two interest rate measures that have received essentially no attention in the 
economics and finance literature in recent years. The study is couched within a loanable funds model 
that includes two ex post real interest rate yields, the monetary base as a percent of GDP, the change 
in per capita real GDP, net financial capital inflows as a percent of GDP, and the budget deficit as a 
percent of GDP. This study uses annual data for the study period 1972-2012, a time period that 
includes “quantitative easing” monetary policies by the Federal Reserve. Two-stage least squares 
estimations reveal that the federal budget deficit, expressed as a percent of GDP, has exercised a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yields on both three-year 
and seven-year Treasury notes, even after allowing for quantitative easing and other factors. The 
study also considers the 1980-2012 time period and offers simple robustness testing.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the U.S., there was a brief experience involving federal government budget surpluses during the 
FY1998 through FY2001 period. However, given the 2001 recession, sluggish economic growth 
following 2001, and budgetary demands involving income tax cuts during the Bush Administration 
on the one hand and the “war on terrorism” in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001 on the other hand, the specter of federal government budget deficits, potentially 
huge ones, raised its ugly head once again by FY 2002. As Alan Krueger (2003) observed, by 2003 
federal budget deficits in the U.S. had re-emerged as a major economic concern.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Over the course of the Bush Administration, the budget deficit as a percent of GDP rose from 
-1.3% (a surplus for FY2001) to values subsequently averaging 2.33% per fiscal year from FY2002 
through FY2008 (Council of Economic Advisors, 2013, Table B-79). Furthermore, during the 
Obama Administration through FY 2012, the federal budget deficit as a percent of GDP has grown 
beyond these figures. Indeed, the federal budget deficit, expressed as a percent of GDP, during 
President Obama’s first term was 10.1%, 9.0%, 8.7%, and 7.8% for FY 2009, FY2010, FY2011, and 
FY 2012, respectively (Council of Economic Advisors, 2013, Table B-79), for an average of 8.9%.1  
 The impact of government budget deficits on interest rates has been studied extensively 
(Al-Saji, 1992, 1993; Barth, Iden and Russek, 1984, 1985, 1986; Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar, 
1989; Cebula, 1997, 2005; Cebula and Cuellar, 2010; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Feldstein and 
Eckstein, 1970; Findlay, 1990; Gale and Orszag, 2003; Hoelscher, 1983, 1986; Holloway, 1988; 
Johnson, 1992; Kiani, 2009; Ostrosky, 1990; Tanzi, 1985; Allen and Wohar, 1996; Zahid, 1988). 
Most of these studies are couched within IS-LM or loanable funds models or variants thereof. Many 
of these studies find that budget deficits act to raise longer-term rates of interest while not 
significantly affecting shorter-term rates of interest. Since capital formation is presumably much 
more affected by longer-term than by shorter-term interest rates, the inference has often been made in 
these studies that government budget deficits may lead to "crowding out" (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; 
Abram and Schmitz, 1978; Cebula, 1985; Krueger, 2003).  
                     
1 Arguably, at least some portion of the first federal budget deficit figure, 10.1%, can be attributable to policies during 
the Bush Administration, although Obama policies such as the “stimulus package” were in play during this fiscal year. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The interest rate/budget deficit literature has focused typically upon the interest rate yields, 
most commonly nominal yields, on 3 month Treasury bills, ten-year Treasury notes, and 20 year and 
30 years Treasury bonds. This literature has also focused upon the interest rate yields on Moody’s 
Aaa-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds. In recent years, however, the impact of budget deficits on 
such interest rate yields has received only limited attention in the literature. Moreover, the focus on 
real interest rates has been even sparser in recent times. 
 The present study is motivated primarily by two basic sets of considerations. The first of these 
motivations, as suggested above, is the huge size of recent federal budget deficits, relative to GDP, 
especially in recent years but in many prior years as well, and the concomitant concern regarding 
potential economic implications thereof. The second motivation is that the impact of budget deficits 
on ex post real interest rate yields on intermediate-term Treasuries, especially those on the three-year 
Treasury note and the seven-year Treasury note, have been effectively altogether ignored in the 
economics and finance literature for a decade or longer.2 Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to 
provide contemporary evidence regarding the effect of the federal budget deficit on the interest rate 
yield on intermediate-term debt issues of the U.S.  Treasury, as represented by the ex post real interest 
rate yields on three-year and seven-year Treasury notes, for the post-Bretton Woods period running 
from 1972 through the end of 2012.  
 More specifically, using annual data, this study investigates the period 1972 through 2012 in 
                     
2 Cebula (2005) may be the most recent such study. He examines the deficit impact on nominal seven-year Treasury 
notes from 1992-2003 using quarterly data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the pursuit of providing at least preliminary contemporary insights into whether federal budget 
deficits—in contrast to the perspective of  “Ricardian Equivalence” (Barro, 1974)—have in fact 
elevated intermediate-term real interest rate yields in the U.S. We begin with 1972 because it was in 
August of 1971 that the U.S. unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods agreement, i.e., unilaterally 
terminated the convertibility of the U.S. dollar for gold, thereby helping to bring the Bretton Woods 
system to a de facto end. Moreover, the study period includes the time frame beginning with late 
November of 2008, which is when the Federal Reserve shifted from its traditional open market 
operations and initiated its “quantitative easing” policies. Indeed, the first of these quantitative easing 
policies, QE (1), involved significant and unprecedented Federal Reserve purchases of 
mortgage-backed securities, which by June, 2010 had totaled $2.1 trillion. In November of 2010, 
another stage of quantitative easing, QE (2), began and resulted in $600 billion of such purchases. 
Finally, beginning in September of 2012, stage QE (3) began, initially involving $40 billion per 
month of such purchases and escalating to $85 billion per month thereof as of December, 2012. Thus, 
the 1972-2012 study period includes not only four full years during which the U.S. economy 
experienced quantitative easing and but also experienced huge (relative to GDP)3 federal budget 
deficits. This study endeavors to provide at least preliminary insights into the following question: 
“What has been the impact of budget deficits on intermediate-term ex post real interest rates in the 
U.S. over the last 42 years after Bretton Woods?” Furthermore, as a very simple test of the robustness 
                     
3 Indeed, only during the World War II fiscal years (FYs) of 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945 has the federal budget deficit 
as a percent of GDP exceeded those of FYs 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the basic model, the study also examines the period from 1980-2012, based upon certain monetary 
policy and financial sector de-regulation statutes that were implemented in late 1979 and early 1980. 
Finally, a second simple robustness test is provided in the Conclusion section to the study.  
 Section 2 of this study provides the basic framework for the empirical analysis, an 
open-economy loanable funds model reflecting dimensions of the works of Barth, Iden and Russek 
(1984; 1985; 1986), Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1989), Hoelscher (1986), Koch (1994), Allen 
and Wohar (1996), Cebula (2005), Cebula and Cuellar (2010), and others. Section 3 defines the 
specific variables in the empirical model and describes the data adopted. Section 4 provides the 
empirical results of two stage least squares estimations for the period 1972-2012, whereas section 5 
provides an analysis of the period 1980-2012, Finally, an overview of the study findings is found in 
the Conclusion, Section 6, where a second simple robustness test of the model is also provided.  
2. The Framework 
In developing the underlying framework for the empirical analysis, we first consider the following 
inter-temporal government budget constraint: 
 NDt+1 = NDt + Gt + Ft + ARtNDt - Tt         (1) 
where: 
 NDt+1 = the national debt in period t+1; 
 NDt = the national debt in period t; 
 Gt = government purchases in period t; 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ft = government non-interest transfer payments in period t; 
 ARt = average effective interest rate on the national debt in period t; and 
 Tt = government tax and other revenues in period t. 
The total government budget deficit in period t (TDt), which is the deficit measured considered in this 
study, is simply the difference between NDt+1 and NDt: 
 TDt = NDt+1 - NDt = Gt + Ft + ARtNDt - Tt      (2) 
 Based extensively on Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984; 1985; 1986), Barth, Iden, Russek, and 
Wohar (1989), and Hoelscher (1986), as well as Koch (1994), Cebula (1997; 2005), and Cebula and 
Cuellar (2010), this study seeks to identify determinants of the ex post real interest rate yields on both 
three-year and seven-year U.S. Treasury notes, including the impact of the federal budget deficit on 
same. To do so, a loanable funds model is adopted in which the real intermediate-term (three-year or 
seven-year) interest rate yield is, assuming all other bond markets are in equilibrium, determined by 
an equilibrium of the following form: 
  DY + MY = TDY – NCIY or DY + MY + NCIY = TDY   (3) 
where: 
 DY = private domestic demand for three-year or seven-year U.S. Treasury notes, expressed 
as a percent of GDP;  
 MY = the monetary base, expressed as a percent of real GDP, adopted as a measure of the 
available potential domestic money supply; 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TDY = net government borrowing, measured by the total federal budget deficit (as above), 
but expressed as a percent of real GDP; and 
 NCIY = net financial capital inflows, also expressed as a percent of real GDP. 
 In this framework, it is hypothesized that: 
DY = DY (RTHREEYR or RSEVENYR, ∆Y, EPRSTBY, EPRLTBY,),  
DYRTHREEYR > 0 or DYRSEVENYR> 0, DY∆Y > 0, DYEPRSTBY < 0, DYEPRLTBY < 0   (4) 
where: 
RTHREEYR = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes; 
RSEVENYR = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes;  
∆Y = the increase in per capita real GDP over the year; 
EPRSTBY = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on high quality short-term bonds; and 
EPRLTBY = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on high quality long-term bonds. 
 Following the conventional wisdom, it is expected that the demand for three-year (or 
seven-year) Treasuries is an increasing function of the real interest rate yield on those notes, i.e., 
RTHREEYR or RSEVENYR (Barth, Iden, and Russek, 1984; 1985; 1986; Hoelscher, 1986; Koch, 
1994). Next, it is hypothesized that the greater the increase in per capita real GDP (∆Y), the higher 
the demand for three-year or seven-year Treasury notes, ceteris paribus, since such a circumstance 
more rapidly increases the potential pool of funds available for purchasing those notes (Hoelscher, 
1986; Cebula, 2005). It is further hypothesized that, paralleling Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984; 1985), 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cebula (1997; 2005), Hoelscher (1986), and Koch (1994), the real domestic demand for three-year 
or seven-year Treasury notes is a decreasing function of the ex post real short-term rate, which in this 
case is the ex post real annual average six-month Treasury bill rate. In other words, as EPRSTBY 
increases, ceteris paribus, bond demanders/buyers at the margin substitute shorter-term issues for 
intermediate-term issues in their portfolios. Similarly, it is hypothesized that, in principle paralleling 
Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984; 1985), Cebula (2005), and Hoelscher (1986), the demand for 
three-year or seven-year Treasury notes is a decreasing function of one or more alternative high 
quality long-term interest rate yields, in this case represented by the ex post real annual average 
interest rate yield on Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds (EPRLTBY), ceteris paribus (Barth, Iden, 
and Russek, 1984; 1985; 1986; Hoelscher, 1983; 1986; Ostrosky, 1990; Koch (1994).      
 Substituting equation (4) into equation (3) and solving for RTHREEYR and then for 
RSEVENYR yields: 
 RTHREEYR = f (TDY, MY, EPRSTBY, EPRLTBY, ∆Y, NCIY)   (5A) 
 RSEVENYR = g (TDY, MY, EPRSTBY, EPRLTBY, ∆Y, NCIY)   (5B)   
where it is hypothesized that:  
 fTDY > 0, fMY < 0, fEPRSTBY > 0, fEPRLTBY > 0, f∆Y > 0, fNCIY < 0   (6A) 
 gTDY > 0, gMY <0, gEPRSTBY > 0, gEPRLTBY > 0, g∆Y > 0, gNCIY < 0   (6B) 
 In both (6A) and (6B), the first of these expected signs is positive to reflect the conventional 
wisdom that when the government attempts to finance a budget deficit, it forces interest rate yields 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
upwards as it competes with the private sector to attract funds from the financial markets, ceteris 
paribus. The expected sign on the monetary base/money supply variable (MY) is negative because 
the greater the available money supply relative to GDP, the greater the offset to the interest-rate 
effects of new debt issues, i.e., in the present context, a greater availability of funds presumably helps 
to offset interest rate effects of budget deficits, ceteris paribus. It is noteworthy that the empirical 
results are effectively identical if the M2 measure of the money supply, expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, is adopted in place of MY; nevertheless, the MY variable is adopted because it more directly 
reflects quantitative easing policies pursued in recent years. The expected sign on the net capital 
inflows variable is negative because the greater the ratio of net capital inflows to GDP, the greater the 
extent to which these funds absorb domestic debt (Koch, 1994; Cebula and Belton, 1993). Finally, the 
expected signs on fEPRSTBY, fEPRLTBY, fY, and fPE and their counterparts in (6B) follow logically from 
equation (4).  
3. Variables and Data 
Given the presence ex post real interest rates in the model, there is no need to develop an empirical 
measurement of expected inflation. Thus, adopting ex post as opposed to ex ante real interest rate 
yields permits the analysis to circumvent the always dubious choice of an appropriate inflationary 
expectations measure (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti, 1990). 
 In any case, based upon the framework expressed above, the two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations involve the following linear models:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTHREEYRt =a0 + a1 TDYt + a2 MYt-1 + a3 EPRSTBYt + a4 EPRLTBYt + a5 ∆Yt-1  
  + a6 NCIYt-1  + ut            (7) 
RSEVENYRt = b0 + b1 TDYt + b2 MYt-1 + b3 EPRSTBYt + b4 EPRLTBYt + b5 ∆Yt-1  
         + b6 NCIYt-1   + ut’        (8) 
where: 
RTHREEYRt  = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes in year 
t, expressed as a percent per annum;  
RSEVENYRt  = the ex post real annual average interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes in 
year t, expressed as a percent per annum;  
a0, b0= constant terms;  
TDYt = the ratio of the nominal total federal budget deficit in year t to the nominal GDP in year t, 
expressed as a percent;  
MYt-1 = the ratio of the monetary base in year t-1 to the nominal GDP in year t-1, expressed as a 
percent;  
EPRSTBYt = the ex post real average interest rate yield on six-month Treasury bills in year t, 
expressed as a percent annum;  
EPRLTBYt = the ex post real average interest rate yield on Moody’s Aaa-rated long-term corporate 
bonds in year t, expressed as a percent per annum;  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆Yt-1 = the change in the level of per capita real GDP between the beginning of year t-1 and the end 
of year t-1;  
NCIYt-1 = the ratio of net financial capital inflows into the U.S. in year t-1, expressed as a percent of 
the GDP in year t-1; and 
ut, ut’= stochastic error terms.   
 The budget deficit is scaled by GDP, as are the monetary base and net capital inflows; this is 
because the sizes of the budget deficit, the monetary base, and net capital flows should be judged 
relative to the size of the economy (Barth, Iden, and Russek, 1985; Hoelscher, 1986; Holloway, 1986; 
Ostrosky, 1990; Day, 1992). The dependent variable in this system, first specified in the form of 
RTHREEYRt and then specified instead in the form of RSEVENYRt, is expressed as 
contemporaneous with the budget deficit variable (TDYt), as well as with the ex post real six-month 
Treasury bill interest rate yield variable (EPRSTBYt), and the ex post real interest rate yield on 
Moody’s Aaa-rated long-term corporate bonds variable (EPRLTBYt). Given that the data are annual 
and given the fact that financial markets are quick-acting markets, such contemporaneous 
specifications are not uncommon in this literature (Hoelscher, 1986; Ostrosky, 1990; Day, 1992; 
Koch, 1994; Cebula, 1997; 2005; Cebula and Cuellar, 2010).  
 Given the contemporaneous components of the specifications in equations (7) and (8), the 
possibility of simultaneity bias naturally arises, which in turn mandates the choosing of instrumental 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
variables for each of the three right-hand side variables in question. The three instruments chosen 
were, as follows: the two-year lag of the annual percentage civilian unemployment rate (URt-2) for the 
budget deficit variable TDYt in year t; the two-year lag of the ex post real average Moody’s Baa-rated 
corporate bond interest rate yield (Baat-2) for the ex post real Moody’s Aaa-rated bond interest rate 
yield in year t, EPRLTBYt; and the two-year lag of the ex post real three-month Treasury bill interest 
rate yield (TBRt-2) for the ex post real six-month Treasury yield in year t, EPRSTBYt. The choice of 
instruments for these variables was based on the fact that, in each case, the lagged instrument was 
highly correlated with the explanatory variable in question, whereas the instruments in question were 
uncorrelated with the error terms in the system.    
 The net capital inflow variable, NCIYt-1, the monetary base variable, MYt-1, and the change in 
per capita real GDP variable, ∆Yt-1, are all lagged one period in order to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. The data for the variables in this analysis were obtained from the Council of Economic 
Advisors (2013, Tables B-1, B-2, B-35, B-42, B-64, B-71, B-73, B-79).  
 For the interested reader, descriptive statistics for each of the variables expressed in equations 
(7) and (8) are provided in Table 1 for the1972-2012 study period. In addition, it is observed for the 
interested reader that, as shown in Table 2, multicollinearity is not a serious problem for the 
explanatory variables in this model for the study period. Indeed, there are only two cases of an 
elevated and potentially problematic (in theory) correlation. The first is that between the EPRSTBY 
variable and the EPRLTBY variable, where r = 0.650; this does not seem to be a concern, however, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because the estimated coefficients on both of these variables are highly statistically significant in all 
of the estimates. The second potential problem is the correlation between MY and TDY, where r = 
0.540; however, this case also seems of little concern because the estimated coefficients on both of 
these variables are statistically significant in all of the estimates. Finally, group unit-root testing 
reveals that the variables in equation (7) are stationary in levels; similarly, the group unit-root testing 
reveals that the variables in equation (8) are stationary in levels.  
4. Initial Estimation Results, 1972-2012 
In this section, empirical results are presented for the two ex post real intermediate Treasury interest 
rate yields for the period 1972-2012; a different study period, one reflecting a possible break in the 
data, is considered in the subsequent section of this study.  
The Real Three-Year Interest Rate Yield  
Testing for heteroskedasticity revealed the need to make a correction for same. Accordingly, the 
2SLS estimate of equation (7), after adopting the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity correction, 
is provided in Table 3. In Table 3, all six of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables 
exhibit the expected signs, with four of these six coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% 
level and one being statistically significant at nearly the 5% level. Furthermore, there is no indication 
of an autocorrelation problem. Furthermore, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
attesting to the overall dependability of the model  
 In this estimate, the coefficient on the monetary base variable, MYt, is negative, as expected, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that a higher ratio of the monetary base relative 
to GDP acts to reduce the ex post real interest rate yield on three-year U.S. Treasury notes. The 
estimated coefficient on the ex post real short-term interest rate variable, EPRSTBYt, is positive, as 
hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the higher the ex post real 
interest rate yield on six-month Treasury bills, the higher the real interest rate yield on three-year 
Treasury notes. This finding presumably reflects competition between the three-year Treasury note 
and counterpart high-quality short-term debt. Similarly, the coefficient on the variable EPRLTBYt is 
also positive, as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the higher the 
ex post real interest rate on long-term Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, the higher the real interest 
rate yield on three-year Treasury notes, presumably because of competition between three-year 
Treasury notes and high-quality long-term debt. Next, the estimated coefficient on the net capital 
inflows variable, NCIYt-1, is negative, as expected and statistically significant at the 3% level, 
implying that such capital flows may act to absorb domestic debt and thereby reduce the real interest 
rate on that debt, i.e., the real three-year Treasury note interest rate yield, in this case. Although the 
estimated coefficient on variable reflecting the change in per capita real GDP, ∆Yt-1, is positive, it is 
not statistically significant at the even the 10% level, implying that the increase in the level of per 
capital real GDP does not significantly influence  the ex post real interest rate yield on three-year U.S. 
Treasury bills. 
 Finally, the estimated coefficient on the budget deficit variable is positive and statistically 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, it appears that after allowing for a variety of other factors, the higher 
the federal budget deficit (as a percent of GDP) the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on 
intermediate-term, i.e., in this case, on three-year Treasury notes. More specifically, for every 1% 
increase in the size of the budget deficit (as a percent of GDP), the ex post real yield on three-year 
Treasury notes rises by about 10 basis points. Hence, a rise in the TDY variable of 5% would elevate 
RTHREEYR by about 50 basis points.  This finding, in principle, is consistent with a variety of 
studies of earlier periods, including Al-Saji (1992, 1993), Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985, 1988), 
Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1989), Cebula (1997), Cebula and Belton (1993), Cebula and 
Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), Gale and Orszag (2003), Gissey (1999), Hoelscher (1986), Johnson 
(1992), Kiani (2009), Tanzi (1985), Allen and Wohar (1996), and Zahid (1988).   
 In closing this sub-section of the study, it is noted that 2SLS estimates for a number of 
alternative specifications of the basic model yield a conclusion for the impact of the budget deficit on 
the real three-year Treasury note interest rate yield that is consistent with that in Table 3, including 
specifications that adopt the percent growth in GDP rather than ∆Yt-1 and/or adopt the ex post real 52 
week Treasury bill yield to represent EPRSTBYt and/or adopt the ex post real interest rate yield on 30 
yield Treasury bonds to represent EPRLTBYt.  
 In any event, the evidence provided in Table 3 would seem to indicate that, among other 
things, the federal budget deficit in the U.S. exercised a positive and statistically significant impact 
upon the ex post real three-year Treasury note interest rate yield over the 1972-2008 study period. The 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
following sub-section of this study investigates empirically whether this conclusion is reached for the 
case of the ex post real seven-year Treasury note yield.  
The Real Seven Year Interest Rate Yield 
In this sub-section of the study, using annual data once again, we empirically investigate the impact 
of federal budget deficits on the ex post real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes over the 
1972-2012 study period. The 2SLS estimate of equation (8), after adopting the Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity correction, for the study period 1972-2012 is provided in Table 4. In Table 4, all 
six of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, with four 
being statistically significant at the 1% level and one being statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 In this estimate, the estimated coefficient on the monetary base (de facto available money 
supply) variable, MYt, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that a higher 
ratio of the monetary base relative to GDP acts to reduce the ex post real interest rate yield on 
seven-year U.S. Treasury notes. The estimated coefficient on the ex post real short-term interest rate 
variable, EPRSTBYt, is positive, as expected, and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying 
that the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on six-month Treasury bills, the higher the real 
interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes. This finding conforms to the hypothesized 
relationship proffered in this study and presumably reflects competition between the seven-year 
Treasury note and shorter-term debt instruments. The coefficient on the variable EPRLTBYt is also 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the higher the ex post real interest 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rate on long-term Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, the higher the real interest rate yield on 
seven-year Treasury notes, presumably also because of competition, in this case, between seven-year 
Treasury notes and longer-term debt instruments. The estimated coefficient on the ∆Yt-(t-1) variable is 
positive, as hypothesized, but not statistically significant at the 10% level, implying that this variable 
did not exercise a statistically significant impact on the real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury 
bills. Next, the estimated coefficient on the net capital inflows variable, NCIYt-1 , is negative and 
statistically significant at the 2.5% level, implying that such capital flows act to absorb domestic debt 
and thusly reduce the real interest rate on that debt, i.e., on seven-year Treasury notes. 
 Finally, the estimated coefficient on the budget deficit variable for the 1972-2012 study 
period is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, it appears that after allowing for 
a variety of other factors, the higher the federal budget deficit (as a percent of GDP) the higher the real 
interest rate yield on intermediate-term, i.e., in this case, on seven-year U.S. Treasury notes. This 
finding is consistent  with a host of empirical studies of earlier periods, including Al-Saji (1992, 
1993), Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985, 1988), Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1989), Cebula 
(1997; 2013), Cebula and Belton (1993), Cebula and Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), Gale and 
Orszag (2003), Gissey (1999), Hoelscher (1986), Johnson (1992), Koch (1994), Kiani (2009), Tanzi 
(1985), Allen and Wohar (1996), and Zahid (1988).       
 Clearly, overall, these results are also consistent with those for the real three-year U.S. 
Treasury note yield found in Table 3. In other words, among other things, the federal budget deficit, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expressed as a percent of GDP, is once again found to exercise a positive impact on the real 
seven-year Treasury note yield, despite quantitative easing policies beginning in 2008. Indeed, it 
appears that for every 1% increase in the size of the budget deficit (as a percent of GDP), the ex post 
real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes rises approximately 11 basis points. Hence, a rise 
in the budget deficit of 5% would elevate RTHREEYR by about 55 basis points.   
5. Estimates for the Period 1980-2012 
In this section of the study, we re-estimate the model using data for a 1972-2012 sub-period, namely, 
the period 1980-2012. The choice of this sub-period is twofold: (1) to provide a de facto simple test 
of robustness of the initial results for 1972-2012 for the impact of the budget deficit on RTHREEYR 
and RSEVENYR; and (2) to test whether the deficit-real interest rate linkage was significantly 
affected during a period when (a) the Federal Reserve embarked on a new monetary policy 
experiment and (b) when significant statutory deregulation of the financial services industry was 
implemented.   
 In November of 1979, the Federal Reserve essentially abandoned, albeit temporarily, i.e., 
until November of 1982 (Barth, 1991), its interest rate targeting policy for a money growth targeting 
policy. In addition, shortly after this policy shift, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of March, 1980 was enacted, largely de-regulating the financial services 
system generally and banks and savings and loan associations in particular (Barth, 1991); this 
de-regulation was reinforced on a more limited scale by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Act of 1982 (Barth, 1991). By beginning the study period with the year 1980, this study can 
potentially clarify whether these changed public policies altered the impact of the federal budget 
deficit on RTHREEYR and RSEVENYR or caused a break in the data. Accordingly, equations (7) 
and (8) are re-estimated for the 1980-2012 time period. The 2SLS results for these two estimates are 
provided in Tables 5 and 6, respectively, for equations (7) and (8), with the Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasicity correction adopted in both instances.  
 In Table 5, five of the six estimated coefficients exhibit the expected sign (that on ∆Y being 
the exception), with four of these five coefficients being statistically at the 1% level; the coefficients 
on variables NCIY and ∆Y both fail to be statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, as found in 
Table 3 for the 1972-2012 study period, the ex post real interest rate yield on three-year Treasury 
notes is a decreasing function of the monetary base variable (MY), while being an increasing function 
of the ex post real short term interest rate yield (EPRSTBY), the ex post real long term interest rate 
yield (EPRLTBY), and the federal budget deficit variable (TDY).  The F-statistic is statistically 
significant at the 1% level once again, attesting to the overall strength of the model for the 1980-2012 
period.  
 Thus, the estimated coefficient on the monetary base (de facto available money supply) 
variable, MYt-1, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that a higher ratio of 
the monetary base relative to the GDP acts to reduce the real interest rate yield on three-year U.S. 
Treasury notes. Interestingly, we observe that these empirical results are essentially identical if the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M2 measure of the money supply, expressed as a percent of GDP, is adopted in lieu of MYt-1. The 
estimated coefficient on the ex post real short-term interest rate variable, EPRSTBYt, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1%  level, implying that the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on 
six-month Treasury bills, the higher the real interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes. This 
finding presumably reflects competition between the three-year Treasury note and counterpart 
short-term financial instruments. Similarly, the coefficient on the variable EPRLTBYt is also positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the higher the ex post real interest rate on 
long-term Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, the higher the real interest rate yield on three-year 
Treasury notes, presumably because of competition between three-year Treasury notes and 
high-quality long-term financial instruments. Although the estimated coefficient on the net capital 
inflows variable, NCIYt-1, is negative, it fails to be statistically significant at the 10% level for the 
1980-2012 period, a result at odds with the findings for this variable for the 1972-2012 study period 
(see Table 3). Finally, the estimated coefficient on the budget deficit variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the higher the federal budget deficit (as a percent of 
GDP), the higher the real interest rate yield on intermediate-term, i.e., in this case, on three-year U.S. 
Treasury notes. In this case, a 5% rise in the deficit-GDP ratio would elevate the real three-year yield 
by approximately 36 basis points. 
 Table 6 provides the model estimate for the case of the real seven-year Treasury note for the 
period 1980-2012 period. These results effectively parallel those in Table 5.  Four of the six estimated 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coefficients are statistically significant with the expected signs at the 1% level, so that RSEVENYR 
is a decreasing function of the monetary base variable and an increasing function of both the real short 
and real long term interest rate variables and the budget deficit variable.  In this case, a 5% increase 
in the deficit-GDP ratio would raise the real seven-year Treasury note rate by 46 basis points.  
6. Concluding Observations 
The present study adopts an open loanable funds model and, first using annual data for the period 
1972-2012 and then for the period 1980-2012, consistently finds that the ex post real interest rate 
yield on three-year U.S. Treasury notes and the ex post real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury 
notes are both an increasing function of the ex post real six-month Treasury bill interest rate yield and 
the ex post real interest rate yield on long-term corporate bonds (Moody’s Aaa-rated), while being a 
decreasing function of the ratio of the monetary base to the GDP level (expressed as a percent) 
and--for the 1972-2012 study period but not the 1980-2012 period-- net financial capital inflows 
expressed as a percent of GDP (expressed as a percent). Furthermore, in contrast to the predictions 
found in Ricardian Equivalence (Barro, 1974), it also is found consistently that the greater the federal 
budget deficit (relative to the GDP level), the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on three-year 
Treasury notes and the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes. More 
specifically, for every 1% increase in the size of the budget deficit (as a percent of GDP), the real 
interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes rises approximately by between 7  and 10 basis points, 
while that on real seven-year Treasury notes yield rises between 9 and 11 basis points.. This finding 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is consistent in principle with a variety of empirical studies of earlier periods, including Al-Saji (1992, 
1993), Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985, 1988), Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1989), Cebula 
(1997; 2013), Cebula and Belton (1993), Cebula and Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), Gale and 
Orszag (2003), Gissey (1999), Hoelscher (1986), Johnson (1992), Kiani (2009), Tanzi (1985), Allen 
and Wohar  (1996), and Zahid (1988).4   
 Before closing, we provide an additional set of estimations that serve as another de facto 
robustness test of the basic model. These estimates involves an autoregressive, i.e., AR(1) process, 
2SLS estimation with (once again) a Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity correction. AR(1) 
models are of interest as a simple process for many times series applications, perhaps best applicable 
to time series that exhibit more volatile behavior, such as stock market indices and prices and interest 
rates. In any case, Tables 7 and 8 provide the AR(1), 2SLS estimates of equations (7) and (8). In both 
tables, all of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs. In Table 7, three of the six 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and two are statistically significant at the 2% 
level. In Table 7, five of the six estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
both estimates, autocorrelation is not an issue, whereas the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 
1% level in both cases. 
 Based upon the results in Table 7, the ex post real interest rate yield on three-year Treasuries 
                     
4 Moreover, it is noteworthy that 2SLS estimates for a number of alternative specifications of the basic model yield results 
for the impact of the budget deficit on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten-year Treasury notes that are consistent with 
those in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. These results will be provided upon request. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is a decreasing function of the monetary base variable (MY) and the net capital inflows variable 
(NCIY) and an increasing function of the ex post real interest rate yield on six-month Treasury bills, 
the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, and the federal budget 
deficit expressed as a percent of GDP. In this estimate, a 1% increase in the latter (TDY) would raise 
RTHREEYR by 7 basis points; a 5% increase in TDY would elevate this real interest rate yield by 35 
basis points.    
 As for the results in Table 8, the ex post real interest rate yield on seven-year Treasury notes 
is a decreasing function of the monetary base variable (MY) and the net capital inflows variable 
(NCIY) while being an increasing function of the ex post real interest rate yield on six-month 
Treasury bills, the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, and the 
federal budget deficit expressed as a percent of GDP. In this estimate, a 1% increase in the value of 
TDY would raise RSEVENYR by 10.3 basis points; a 5% increase in TDY would elevate this real 
interest rate yield by 51-52 basis points.    
 In sum, it appears that factors elevating the U.S. budget deficit act to raise the real 
intermediate-term (real three-year and real seven-year) cost of borrowing, presumably through 
increasing the competition for loanable funds. This confirms Alan Krueger’s (2003) statement that 
federal budget deficits cause interest rates to rise. Thus, federal government policies that raise the 
budget deficit cannot be viewed in a vacuum since they may very well impact adversely upon the 
finances of corporations and households and, accordingly, the real investment in new plant and 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
equipment, durable consumption outlays, real GDP growth, and both the level of the employment 
rate and rate of employment growth of the U.S. Crowding out of private investment may be a very 
real threat to the economy, at least over the longer run, so long as huge budget deficits largely 
financing government transfers continue to be incurred (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Abram and 
Schmitz, 1978; Cebula, 1985; Krueger, 2003). These results further imply that it behooves 
policy-makers to take responsible steps to limit the relative magnitude of federal budget deficits so as 
to enable the economy to sustain investment in new plant and equipment and continue a sustainable 
long term economic growth path. Indeed, a continuation of huge budget deficits in concert with 
quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve could, among other things, lead to a decline in faith in the 
U.S. dollar and the loss of its stature as the principal reserve currency of the global economy; such a 
development could yield a harvest of economic difficulties for the U.S.   
 Arguably, identifying specific policies to alleviate the federal budget deficit problem in the 
U.S. are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, as stressed above, it is clear that a continuation 
of huge budget deficits in concert with quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve is not sustainable. 
Candidates for reform to alleviate the deficit problem could (and perhaps should) include some form 
of overhaul of the myriad entitlement programs provided by the federal government. Many state 
governments within the U.S. are already making such adjustments.  For example, implementation of 
a significant near-term an permanent implementation of a raising of the minimum age at which 
benefits such as Social Security can be received would seem appropriate if not necessary to the long 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
term sustainability of the federal budget and to the control of budget deficits. Age-eligibility policies 
can of course be linked to the life expectancy data of the U.S. population. A review of what 
constitutes “disability” for the purposes of receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
benefits would seem worth considering. Revocation of the increasingly unpopular Patient Protection 
and Affordability Act of 2010 would be an example of another course of action to consider, with 
perhaps a simpler, more efficient, and less Draconian, less-political and less costly approach to 
healthcare in the U.S. adopted in its place. The passage of a meaningful balanced-budget 
amendment could also be a useful tool to facilitate and expedite budget deficit reduction. Such 
modest suggestions as these remain however simply speculative for purposes of the present study. 
Additional alternative analyses within one or more different analytical/empirical frameworks should 
nevertheless be undertaken so as to provide arguably less speculative deficit-size solutions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  1972-2012 (Annual Data)   
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
 
RTHREEYR  1.96  2.64  7.62  -3.16    
RSEVENYR 2.47  2.62  8.12  -3.28 
TDY   3.13  2.67  10.1  -2.40 
MY   67.25  31.98  73.24  47.59 
EPRSTBY 1.04  2.34  5.54  -3.10   
EPRLTBY 3.70  2.58  8.84  -2.53   
∆Y   113.90  46.4  222.80  -41.40   
NCIY   1.961  1.73  5.725  -0.832 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix among Independent Variables, 1972-2012 
 
  TDY   MY   EPRSTBY EPRLTBY ∆Y        NCIY   
 
TDY  1.000 
 
 
 
MY  0.540  1.000 
 
 
 
EPRSTBY -0.151  -0.444     1.000 
 
 
 
EPRLTBY 0.229  -0.179      0.650 1.000 
 
 
∆Y  -0.417  -0.235      0.149 -0.032  1.000 
 
 
NCIY  -0.037  0.173      -0.086 0.001  0.471  1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 2SLS Estimation Results, 1972-2012 
Dependent Variable: RTHREEYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Explanatory Variable   
Constant  0.69  1.83  0.0746  
   
TDY    0.096*** 4.13  0.0002  
 
MY     -0.012*** -4.91  0.0000 
 
EPRSTBY   0.759*** 7.04  0.0000 
 
EPRLTBY   0.292*** 3.97  0.004 
 
∆Y    96.6  0.59  0.5585 
 
NCIY   -0.106** -2.28  0.0301 
 
DW   2.06 
Rho   -0.03 
Instrument Rank 10 
F-Statistic***  45.44 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 2SLS Estimation Results, 1972-2012 
Dependent Variable: RSEVENYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Variable 
 
Constant  0.334  2.48  0.0182 
 
TDY    0.108*** 6.53  0.0000 
  
MY     -0.012*** -7.13  0.0000 
 
EPRSTBY  0.397*** 4.97  0.0000 
 
EPRLTBY   0.622*** 11.08  0.0000 
 
∆Y    0.056  0.56  0.5789 
     
NCIY   -0.09** -2.40  0.0217 
   
DW   2.07 
Rho   -0.04 
Instrument Rank 10 
F-Statistic***  68.7 
  
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 2SLS Estimation Results, 1980-2012 
Dependent Variable: RTHREEYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Explanatory Variable   
Constant  0.55  2.39  0.0244  
   
TDY    0.072*** 3.91  0.0006  
 
MY     -0.009*** -2.95  0.0066 
 
EPRSTBY   0.871*** 6.63  0.0000 
 
EPRLTBY   0.247***  2.81  0.0092 
 
∆Y    -44.4  -0.24  0.8139 
 
NCIY   -0.042  -0.58  0.5665 
 
DW   2.24 
Rho   -0.12 
Instrument Rank 10 
F-Statistic***  35.74 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values..***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 2SLS Estimation Results, 1980-2012 
Dependent Variable: RSEVENYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Variable 
 
Constant  0.206  1.23  0.2280 
 
TDY    0.092*** 6.86  0.0000 
  
MY     -0.01*** -4.26  0.0002 
 
EPRSTBY  0.439*** 4.68  0.0001 
 
EPRLTBY   0.615*** 10.90  0.0000 
 
∆Y    -2.59  -0.02  0.9819 
     
NCIY   -0.06  -1.31  0.2030 
   
DW   2.16 
Rho   -0.08 
Instrument Rank 10 
F-Statistic***  40.27 
  
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Autoregressive 2SLS Estimation Results, 1972-2012 
Dependent Variable: RTHREEYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Variable   
 
Constant  0.24  0.34  0.7304 
 
TDY    0.07**  2.56  0.0155 
 
MY    -0.011*** -5.27  0.0000 
 
EPRSTBY  0.713*** 14.01  0.0000 
 
EPRLTBY   0.329*** 8.05  0.0000 
 
∆Y    131.75  1.40  0.1726 
 
NCIY   -0.117** -2.64  0.0126 
 
AR (1)   0.092  0.34  0.7304 
 
DW   1.87 
Rho   0.06 
J-Statistic**  12.05 
Inverted AR Root 0.09 
Instrument Rank 14 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Autoregressive 2SLS Estimation Results, 1972-2012 
Dependent Variable:  RSEVENYR 
   Coefficient t-value  р-value 
Variable  
 
Constant  0.23*  2.02  0.512 
 
TDY    0.103*** 6.27  0.0000 
 
MY    -0.013*** -9.17  0.0000 
 
EPRSTBY  0.349*** 6.99  0.0000 
 
EPRLTBY   0.663*** 19.03  0.0000 
 
∆Y    127.3  1.42  0.1649 
 
NCIY   -0.11*** -3.18  0.0032 
  
AR (1)   -0.087  -0.42  0.6779 
 
DW   2.03 
Rho   -0.02 
J-Statistic**  12.37 
Inverted AR Root -0.09  
Instrument Rank 14 
   
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant 
at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
